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EFFECT OF ENTERPISE BREAK-UPS ON PERFORMANCE: 






The empirical transition literature on the comparison of restructuring prior to privatization is 
quite limited. Macedonia is a specific case among transition economies where a large number of 
break-ups occurred at the beginning of privatization. Using firm-level data, we estimate the 
effects of the break-ups of enterprises on the subsequent performance of the “master enterprises” 
and spun off divisions during the period of privatization. We estimate the performance effects by 
comparing the performance of enterprises that remained intact to the performance of enterprises 
that experienced spin-offs and the newly established subsidiaries. The goal is to provide 
empirical evidence on the issue of the effect of pre-privatization restructuring. Our results 
suggest that the breakups were not guided by efficiency or performance goals but rather 
managerial self-interests.  
 
Empirická literatura zabývající se porovnáváním výsledku restrukturalizace pred privatizací není 
rozsáhlá a sama Makedonie je specifickým prípadem mezi transformacními ekonomikami nebot 
na pocátku privatizace zde došlo k  znacnému poctu rozpadu podniku. S  využitím dat na 
podnikové úrovni porovnáváme efekt rozpadu podniku na výkonnost vzniklých následníku, a to 
jak tzv. materského podniku, tak odštepených jednotek po následné privatizaci. Vliv na 
výkonnost odhadujeme pomocí porovnání výkonnosti podniku, u kterých nedošlo k  rozpadu, 
spolu s výkonností jak materských podniku tak s výkonností nove vzniklých jednotek. Naším 
cílem je poskytnout další empirické poznatky o restrukturalizaci predcházející privatizaci. Naše 
výsledky ukazují, že rozpady podniku nebyly motivovány výkonnostními cílí ale spíše 




JEL Classifications: D21, D24, L11, P11 
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1. Introduction 
As the Central and East European (CEE) countries embarked on the transition from a 
planned to a market economy in the 1990s, the restructuring of state and socially owned 
enterprises (SOEs) became a major policy issue in the region. One of the most important forms 
of restructuring observed during the CEE transition was the massive breakup of SOEs since it 
leads to (1) altering (reducing) the size of firms, (2) increasing the number of firms, and, finally 
(3) allows to bring in new management. As analyzed in Lizal et al. (1995, 2001) for 
Czechoslovakia, many divisions (subsidiaries) of SOEs applied to their supervisory ministries 
for permission to break away from their “master enterprise.”
1 In Macedonia, which became 
independent in 1991, the break-ups occurred more spontaneously and without any supervision of 
government or its officials. A phenomenal wave of spin-offs occurred at the beginning of the 
1990’s, giving rise to a large number of new firms led by new top management. In this respect, 
Macedonia is another specific case among transition economies where large numbers of break-
ups occurred at the beginning of privatization. 
The most important question that arises is whether the  break-ups have systematic 
economic effects by improving or worsening the performance of the spun off subsidiaries and/or 
the remaining master enterprises. CEE countries have displayed major problems with 
management’s appropriation of profit and asset stripping in the presence of weak ownership and 
legal frameworks (Lizal et al., 1995, 2001; Ellerman, 1998; Weiss and Nikitin, 1998; Stiglitz, 
1999; Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). Moreover, the timing of many break-ups and the way the 
privatization of SOEs has been conducted in Macedonia, where insiders were able to become 
new owners
2, indicate that there might be a systematic correlation between the spin-offs and 
method of privatization adopted. As suggested by many descriptive studies (see, for example, 
Markovska, 2000) with a limited general empirical evidence, the rent-seeking behavior of 
managers in Macedonia resulted in asset-stripping and siphoning-of of profits. Our analysis is 
based on balance sheet and income statement data for the period of 1991-1999 and fills an 
important gap in understanding the Macedonian way of pre-war transition; it also represents an 
important policy-relevant study for main economic policy decision-makers in Macedonia. 
Moreover, our findings on Macedonian enterprises should be of general interest in the transition 
                                                 
1 However, as was pointed out by Kotrba (1995) in the case of the Czech Republic, the 
process of enterprise breakups had a significant role in the determination of the structure of the 
following privatization program.  
2 As reported in Prasnikar et al (2002), it was more likely that firms with more employees 
but less capital per worker chose the internal privatization method, as it was cheaper for 
employees to buy such a firm. Moreover, internally privatized firms were more efficient at the   3 
context, especially if directly comparable to Lizal et al. (2001), in providing additional evidence 
on early restructuring and its subsequent effect on enterprise performance in an environment 
where the institutional structure and legal protection were very weak. 
Our study is new in several aspects and enhances the insight on breakups in transition 
economies provided by Lizal et al. (1995, 2001). First, our data cover all breakups that occurred 
as these changes were well documented by state agencies. Thus, our data is unambiguous in this 
respect and covers all changes. In addition, we possess data on multiple breakups when the 
original enterprises split into more than two new entities. Such types of fragmentation are more 
frequent than simple spin-off of a new firm. These specifics of our data guarantees that our 
results are more robust that those of Lizal et al. (2001), who limited their study to spin-offs of a 
single subsidiary from the master enterprise due to lack of documentation of the splits in 
Czechoslovakia. Third, our time span is almost a decade long thus sufficient enough to separate 
pre- and post-split periods, although we have excluded years of hyperinflation and war turmoil. 
Finally, although Macedonia is a country that has not been subject to many economic studies 
yet, we able to use data on all Macedonian enterprises. 
 
2. A Conceptual Framework for Breakups 
The tradeoff between transaction costs via markets and the internal inefficiencies within 
organizations is the main focus of the literature on the desirability of takeovers, mergers, and 
break-ups of firms in market economies.
3 The relevant studies in the transition context focus on 
the bargaining between the key decision-makers that are managers, government  officials 
(politicians), workers, and new private owners.
4 The institutional information suggests that the 
management of either the master enterprise or the subsidiary initiated breakups and spin-offs or 
the split was a result of mutual bargaining and agreement. 
Conceptualizing the process, the literature conventionally assumes that the compensation 
of the top management of the firm before the break-up is an increasing function of performance 
                                                                                                                                                             
time of privatization although their efficiency deteriorated after privatization. 
3 See e.g., Coase (1937), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Williamson (1975, 1985), Chandler 
(1990), Klein et al. (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987), 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Hart and Moore (1990), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), and 
Radner and van Zandt (1992). 
4 See e.g., Aghion et al. (1994), Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Prasnikar et al. (1994), and 
Lizal et al. (1995, 2001). The internal privatization methods such as employee buy-out and 
management buy-out were widely adopted in the privatization process in former Yugoslav 
countries. Slovenia and Macedonia are two examples were the majority of firms in privatization 
processes chose internal privatization, as documented by Domadenik et al. (2001), Prasnikar and 
Gregoric (2002), Markovska et al .(2002) and Prasnikar et al. (2002).    4 
of the entire firm, while after the split it is a positive function of the performance of the 
remaining master enterprise only. Analogously, the compensation of the management of a 
subsidiary before the spin-off is an increasing function of performance of the entire firm, 
adjusted for the relative importance of the subsidiary, but it becomes a positive function of the 
performance of the subsidiary only after the split. Rational behavior of managers (whose utility 
solely depends on the performance of the enterprise) in this setting yields two competing 
hypotheses: 
1. Break-ups occur because the top managers of the SOEs discard poorly performing 
divisions in order to improve the performance of the (remaining) master enterprises, or 
2. Break-ups are observed because managers of the divisions (subsidiaries) of SOEs spin 
more efficient units away from the master enterprises. 
Since the firms under central planning were often artificially large, we also allow for the 
situation in which the enterprises suffered from diseconomies of scale. In case of inefficiencies 
of scale the performance of both post-split remaining units can be improved by unbundling 
(split). Thus, there is also a third scenario: 
3. Break-ups result in superior performance of both the spun off units and the remaining 
master enterprises and occur because the large former SOEs suffer from diseconomies of scale. 
Nevertheless, various studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that the above outlined 
scenarios 1.-3. are far from reality in transition economies. As government control over 
management remained weak in the absence of a solid legal framework, appropriation of profit 
and asset stripping by managers has become a serious problem in Macedonia as in other 
transition countries. This phenomenon manifested itself in the creation of by-pass enterprises
5 to 
siphon off the profits of the former SOEs via newly established enterprises.
6 Moreover, as the 
methods of privatization allowed for managerial buy-out and since smaller firms with less so-
called socially owned capital were evaluated at a lower price than before the spin off, 
management could pursue the spin-off strategy to increase the probability of a successful buy-
                                                 
5 Please note that the concept of so-called by-pass enterprises established in the literature on 
Slovenia does not really apply to Macedonia despite the common roots of Macedonian and 
Slovenian economies in the former Yugoslavia. 
6 Djankov and Murrell (2002) report that in an environment where negligent or fraudulent 
behavior by managers (maximizing their own utility function) is severely punished when 
uncovered, managers have the choice of working hard and getting bonuses or slacking off and 
living off their salary alone. In contrast, where bad behavior goes unpunished, managers have 
the choice of stripping enterprise assets (also in the form of spin offs and being privatised by 
themselves) and getting a huge windfall now, as opposed to working hard through the years and 
receiving compensation through bonuses. The evidence in Black et al. (2000) shows that many 
Russian managers chose the first “option.”   5 
out, although it was inefficient from the economic point of view and both units; master and 
subsidiary firms perform worse than before the spin-off. Finally, a fourth hypothesis is: 
4. Break-ups occur because managers of master firm and/or subsidiaries anticipate increase 
in future private benefits even if their unit and the master enterprise perform worse as a result of 
the break-up.
7 
In this fourth scenario the utility of managers of divisions and master firm does not depend on 
the performance of their firms and the pursuit of managerial private goals worsens enterprise 
performance.
8 Such strategy provides evidence against the classical models when the managerial 
utility is assumed to be aligned with the firm’s performance. 
The four hypotheses hence provide a rationale for observing the following four 
outcomes: (i) the effect of a break-up on performance is positive for the master enterprise and 
negative for the subsidiary (Hypothesis 1), (ii) the effect is positive for the subsidiary and 
negative for the master firm (Hypothesis 2), (iii) the effect is positive for both the master 
enterprise and the subsidiary (Hypothesis 3), and (iv) the effect is negative f or both units 
(Hypothesis 4). The magnitude of the effects implied by hypotheses 1 - 4 will of course depend 
on the overall economic environment. 
Table 1 below shows how the possible empirical outcomes on performance are linked 
with the mentioned hypotheses. In italics we denote the possible situation when the spin-off was 
initiated in order to “move” the inefficiencies to the other unit (so the effect is nil on the 
“initiator” unit). This can be due to many reasons, namely as an outcome of bargaining or 
strategic behavior of the unit with Nil effect (most likely initiator of the split). We discuss the 
bargaining process and its possible outcomes later. 
Table 1   Empirical Outcomes and Hypotheses Support 
Effect on Master?  
 
?Effect on Subsidiary 
Negative  Nil  Positive 
Negative  H4  H4, H1  H1 
Nil  H4, H2  H1, H2, H4  H1 
Positive  H2  H2  H3 
Italics denote possible outcome with bargaining or strategic behavior of the unit with Nil effect. 
                                                 
7 While our first three hypotheses are identical to those introduced by the Lizal et al. (2001), 
the last one is more general and also includes their original hypothesis as a special case. 
8 Prasnikar et al. (1998) report that effect of early restructuring via by-passes for Slovenian 
firms was mostly positive. The firms (or top managers of these firms) that established by-passes 
were more likely to behave in the profit-maximization manner like their western counterparts 
compared to other SOEs. In those cases pursuing managerial goals led to improved enterprise   6 
In the Appendix 1 we outline a simple analysis that is in line with the analysis of Lizal et 
al. (2001) that yields the predictions of the first two hypotheses outlined in the introduction. The 
last hypothesis involves special behavioral motivation, which is not formally incorporated into 
the theoretical model as it violates the classical assumptions of managerial motivation being 
derived only from the enterprise performance. However, the empirical analysis allows us to 
discover this effect and we discuss it in conjunction with another model of the breakups as well. 
Individual units of SOEs could spin off from their master enterprises. In our empirical work we 
have been able to identify about 66 cases of such a split, mostly with multiple subsidiaries 
emerging (overall 130 new firms emerged from the 66 master enterprises). 
We can always assume that if subsidiaries (masters) suffered from the split and the 
master part (subsidiary) benefited, the respective management was able to design compensation 
schemes enabling the benefits of splits to be shared (see Lizal et al. 1995). For an observed split 





M has to hold, where subscript M denotes master enterprise, S subsidiary 
and M+S the whole firm before the split. 
It can be shown that if we allow for bargaining with side-payments between subsidiary 
and master managements, the implications of the model do not change. The bargaining model of 
Lizal et al. (1995) shows that if the managerial benefits from the split are relatively small, the 
managers can decide not to split. However, if the (private) benefits are large, these dominate any 
possible side-payment and the optimal strategy is always to split. Therefore, in the case of side-
payments (and bargaining over these) we would have just slight hysteresis around the point of 
no or relatively small private benefits with comparison to efficiency measures. Other 
implications of the model remain unchanged. 
 
3. Institutional Framework 
3.1. Macroeconomic Transition in the Nineties 
Macedonian transition path in the nineteen nineties could be described as a zigzag 
development. After declaring its independence in 1991, Macedonia lost more than 60 percent of 
its markets due to the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, and inherited high inflation that reached 
86 percent per month in April 1992. Macedonia started the reforming process as one of the 
poorest region of former Yugoslavia with significant external debt and an “old-fashioned” 
structure of its economy. A macroeconomic stabilization program was not introduced until 1993. 
It was based on a restrictive monetary policy, strict fiscal discipline, a policy of a managed 
                                                                                                                                                             
performance as well.   7 
floating exchange rate and wage control. Although the stabilization policy was relatively 
successful, and pro-market structural reforms were carried out gradually, they were 
inconsistently implemented. For example, between 1994 and 1999 the strategy of privatization 
was changed several times leading to a lack of transparency. Commercial banks continued to 
finance failing firms, leading to the continuation of soft-budget constraints (Drummond, 2000). 
Additional difficulties involved the unfavorable foreign political and economic circumstances 
that faced Macedonia after declaring its independence, including an economic embargo by 
Greece in a dispute over the country's name and national flag, and UN sanctions against 
neighboring Serbia. As a result, Macedonia became a very important trade network for 
supplying Kosovo and Serbia, mostly based on the development of an informal economy and 
war profiteering. The revolt of the Albanian population (accounting for more than 22% of total 
population) represented a major crisis for the country in 2001. In the aftermath of this rebellion, 
the Albanian “minority” was given more rights, reflected also in the parliamentary elections in 
the autumn of 2002. 
The economy was plagued by an increasing current account deficit, and by an extremely 
high rate of unemployment that reached 36 percent in 1997. Promising results were not achieved 
until 1996-1999: inflation fell to 2.6 percent in 1996, and prices even continued to drop in 1998 
and 1999. In the years 2000 through 2002, the inflation was 5.8, 5.5 and 3.8% respectively. GDP 
only started to rise following many years of recession after 1996.
 9 A drop in GDP of 4.1% in 
2001 was due to the drop in almost all sectors, save general government consumption. The GDP 
is expected to achieve an average growth of 3.7% per year in the next five-year period. 
NATO’s attacks on a major trading partner, Serbia,
 10 in 1999 during the Kosovo crisis 
significantly weakened the Macedonian economy. Exports and imports of goods and services 
fell dramatically, as did flows on the capital account. After the Kosovo crisis was over, a new 
spurt of growth began with the help of the international community. However, these positive 
developments were again interrupted when an internal insurgency broke out in early 2001. 
Despite the ongoing crisis in the region, the budget deficit turned into a surplus in 1999 and the 
state was able to begin to repay its external debt. The country maintained a budget surplus in 
2000; however, in 2001 the budget was again in deep deficit, reaching as much as 6% of GDP. 
This was mainly due to increased government expenditures and lower budget revenues because 
                                                 
9 1.2% growth of GDP in 1996, 1.4% in 1997, 2.9% in 1998, 2.7% in 1999, and 4.5% in 
2000 is mostly due to construction, communication and trade industry development, especially 
because of the SME sector’s growth. The growth of industry production was negative 
throughout 1999, but achieved a noticeable 8% (manufacturing even 9.4%) growth in 2000.  
10 Together with Montenegro, Serbia accounts for 23% of total Macedonian export. Main   8 
of the Kosovo crisis. Nevertheless, the country was able to lower its total external debt also in 
2001, with inflows of funds from direct foreign investment that rose almost threefold in 
comparison with the previous year. 
 
3.2. Privatization Process 
The privatization of socially owned enterprises (SOEs) started in 1989 with so-called 
Markovic Law on Transformation of Enterprises with Social Capital that applied in all the 
regions of former Yugoslavia. This privatization had mainly involved the sale of shares to 
employees, and so a substantial internally owned shareholding base already existed in many 
firms.
11 There was also a significant presence of foreign owned capital resulting from joint-
ventures. There were many cases in which there was external ownership of shares by other firms 
arising from the organization of large socially owned companies into holding companies, or 
through the disintegration of large conglomerates into separate but inter-related firms. These 
processes, which were intensive in the late 1980s, gave rise to a substantial amount of external 
cross-ownership between firms. However, “social” capital remained as a major portion of most 
firms' capital base, and the need for privatization, or “ownership transformation”, as it was 
called by the Yugoslav policy makers, remained. The main privatization wave was in the period 
of 1994-1996 after the new Privatization Law was enacted. 
Following the new Privatization Law (1993), the Macedonian government pursued a 
mixed privatization strategy that allowed firms to choose between a variety of methods of 
privatization: employee buy-out (EBO)
12, sale of a firm or part of it, leveraged management 
buy-out/ buy-in (MBO/MBI), the issue of shares for additional investment, debt/equity swaps, 
leasing, sale of assets and privatization of a firm in bankruptcy. Firms that had not opted for 
voluntary privatization by 1995, which included most medium sized and large firms, became 
subject to compulsory privatization by the Privatization A gency. Those firms were mainly 
privatized using internal buy-out (especially management buy-out) under special buy-out 
conditions. Managers were required to put up only 10 percent of the purchase price with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
export articles are food, beverages, tobacco; miscellaneous manufactures, iron and steel. 
11 Of all former Yugoslav republics, Macedonia had carried out the 1989 Yugoslav Law on 
Social Capital with the greatest vigor. In consequence, the share of private capital in Macedonia 
already accounted for 18 percent of the total capital of socially-owned firms in 1991, while the 
Yugoslav average in that year was only 2 percent (Markovska, 2001). 
12 The EBO method was mainly designed for small firms’ privatization, and was largely 
carried out in 1994 and 1995. Under an EBO, employees were offered discounts of 30 percent 
plus a further 1 percent for each year of employment in the firm. The maximum amount that 
could be bought by any one employee was limited to EURO 12,500. For ancillary units such as 
hotels and restaurants, discounts of 50 percent were made available.   9 
remainder to be paid in installments over ten years. Typically, the most profitable, or potentially 
profitable, enterprises were sold to managers at substantial discounts, often on the basis of 
severely undervalued asset valuations. Weaker and smaller enterprises were sold to employees 
often at more inflated valuations of assets. The main methods of privatization adopted therefore 
were management and employee buy-outs, with management buy-outs being the most prevalent 
in terms of both employment and the value of equity involved.
13 
External ownership was mostly formed through four different ways. First, the 
privatization law automatically acknowledged the ownership of firms domiciled in former 
Yugoslav republics over their business units in Macedonia. Second, firms with huge losses were 
mostly privatized to banks through debt-to-equity swaps or through the leasing out of assets. 
Third, some firms were sold off to foreign investors. This has mostly involved acquisitions of 
firms that have competitive advantages by world standards. Fourth, a very common method of 
privatization was the establishment of “spin-off” or subsidiary firms. Those firms, among other 
things, also provided re-employment possibilities for unemployed workers
14. Since their owners, 
the ‘parent’ firms, chose both internal and external methods of privatization it is extremely 
difficult to classify the resulting subsidiary firms in one group or another. After starting 
relatively late, the privatization program was carried out quickly and was largely completed by 
the end of 1997, by which time over one thousand enterprises had been fully privatized and only 
234 remained in the privatization process. 
The present ownership structure in privatized Macedonian firms still reflects the 
privatization model chosen and is dispersed among National Pension funds, domestic and 
foreign enterprises and employees. The specific privatization method and an unfavorable 
corporate governance system with high decision-making power of workers and managers 
impede the faster restructuring of Macedonian firms. 
 
4. The Empirical Analysis 
4.1. The Econometric Models 
Our empirical strategy is to estimate the performance effect of a spin-off by comparing 
the performance of enterprises that were present throughout the period, but did not experience 
any spin-offs, to the performance of (1) the newly spun off subsidiaries and (2) the master 
enterprises that did experience spin-offs. The method is based on comparing the performance of 
a treatment group (enterprises involved in a break-up) to a control group (enterprises not 
                                                 
13 Management buyouts accounted for EURO 0.65 billion of assets out of a total value of 
assets of privatized enterprises of EURO 1.75 billion.   10 
undergoing a break-up). As the method controls for the relevant pre-spin-off conditions in these 
firms it allows to control for the initial stage the firms evolved from prior the split. 
Enterprise performance p may be measured in a number of ways. To provide a relatively 
broad set of tests and comparison to results for Czechoslovakian firms (Lizal et al, 2001), we 
start with three performance indicators: 
  1)  Value Added/Labor, 
  2)  Profit/Labor, 
3)  Profitability (Profit/Capital). 
Profitability is the traditional and most widely used measure of performance. The two 
alternative measures (scaled by labor) should check how sensitive the findings are to these 
different measures of performance in the context of labor-managed firm hypotheses (see e.g., 
Ward, 1958; Vanek, 1970; and Prasnikar et al., 1994). There are at least two reasons for also 
using value added per worker as a performance variable. Value added per worker is a measure of 
productive efficiency of the firm when we analyze the impact of break-ups on value added per 
worker while controlling for variables that approximate an arbitrary production function. In this 
sense our analysis may be seen as testing the impact of break-ups on productive efficiency. 
Value added per worker is also traditionally assumed to be one of the likely objective functions 
of labor-managed firms. Workers (insiders) are widely believed to have gained influence in 
enterprises during the transition (e.g., Blanchard, 1997; and Burda, 1993). Micro-evidence also 
indicates that they tend to appropriate a significant portion of value added (Prasnikar and 
Svejnar, 1998) in the former Yugoslavia. An analysis of the impact of break-ups on value added 
per worker is useful as it measures the impact on what is often an important objective of the 
firm. 
We also try other indicators that might capture the motivation of managers and/or effect 
of the split. In the empirical analysis we have include measures that tackle cost efficiency and 
productivity (constraint by market): 
4) Costs/Labor, and 
5) Sales/Labor. 
The effect of the split can be captured by allowing the expected future performance to be 
a function of two sets of arguments: 
  E ( p after split ) = p (spin-off characteristics ￿ pre-spin-off characteristics) , 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 For an example see Bartlett (1997).   11 
where the spin-off characteristics capture the effect of the spin-off, and the pre-split 
characteristics are firm-specific indicators that represent the available information from which 
the expectations of future performance of the enterprise might be inferred. 
Using data on the spun off subsidiaries and master enterprises that experienced break-ups 
as well as those that did not (control group), we estimate coefficient of interest a, and vector b in 
the following model: 
   , e    +   d   +   X   =   i i i i a b p ¢   (1) 
where index i denotes firms, pi is a relative measure of enterprise performance, Xi are variables 
controlling for pre-split conditions, di is a dummy variable indicating the split. The empirical 
specification also includes time, industrial, and other dummies if necessary. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) would generate consistent estimates of the parameter of 
interest  a and vector  ß if the unobserved random characteristics of an enterprise did not 
influence the occurrence of a spin-off. However, the process of determination of  di (split) is 
most likely correlated with unobserved characteristics of the enterprise, such as the ability of 
management, know-how or bargaining. As a result, we should expect that 
    0     )   d | e (   E i i „   (2). 
The error term in equation (1) is likely to be correlated with di, and OLS estimates are in this 
case inconsistent. The solution to this problem is a standard one (see e.g., Madalla, 1983; or 
Heckman and Singer, 1985). T he simplest and most robust approach utilizes the use of 
instrumental variables (IVs), where the instruments for di are variables that are correlated with di 
but not with ei. In theory, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is more efficient, but it is 
sensitive to misspecification. Therefore, we selected the more robust IV approach. 
Our vector of control variables consists of the following variables and their 
transformations that are able to approximate arbitrary functions: labor (number of employees), 
capital (we work with both Taylor approximation and with the trans-log model terms), and can 
be augmented with industry dummy variables for industry groups and time dummies. The 
simple and flexible additive form represents a second-order approximation to any production 
(performance) function. 
The crucial task is to link the IV method with the institutional environment, described in 
section 3, such that the method gives the best (consistent and efficient) results to assess the 
treatment effect. As the error term is likely to be correlated with some regressors we need to find 
relevant instruments. However, the proper choice of instruments, which is crucial for success, 
depends on the institutional environment that drives the changes in the enterprise structure. The   12 
other issue is the empirical specification of the estimated equation that has to be in line with the 
institutional frameworks as well. 
The safe instruments, which are available, come from the privatization agency and are 
related to the socialist characteristics (i.e., centrally-planned variables that the enterprises 
inherited from the past) and hence are not correlated with the error term: 
•  Social capital, capital nominated for privatization, capital transferred to the state fund 
prior privatization and total book value of the capital; 
•  Technology (like industry dummies); 
•  Regional location (Skopje, main cities, rural areas). 
As our analysis of the institutional framework suggested, the relevant instruments could 
also be: 
•  Method of privatization (we could expect that managers as the main decision makers in 
the privatization process in the firm anticipated the method of privatization (internal or 
external) before it was formally applied, initiated spin-offs of more profitable units in 
order to privatize it by MBO or, vice versa, spun off less profitable units in order to 
privatize master enterprise; the choice of privatization might play an important role in 
explaining spin-offs), 
•  The performance indicators (sufficiently lagged) before spin-off occurred might be the 
best instruments (as well as interacted with industry dummies). 
The validity of the additional instruments needs to be verified, e.g., tested using the 
Hausman test whether the results using richer sets differ substantially. Our empirical estimation 
shows that the method of privatization is always a valid instrument (with a single-case exception 
of costs/labor in 1998 due to the significant change in the non-reported coefficients), the 
sufficiently lagged values (early nineteen nineties) cannot be perceived as a “consistent set.”
15 
 
4.2. Data Description 
Our empirical analysis is based on data for all enterprises in Macedonia, apart from 
agriculture, that underwent the process of privatization in the period of 1994-1999 and that 
submitted financial statements to the Agency for Payment Operations. 
                                                 
15 In order to provide the full set of results we have also included the results based on the 
questionable enlarged instrument set with 1991/1992 values. It is worth mentioning that the 
visible difference in the coefficients of interests is only in the case of sales/labor (Table 7), in all 
other cases the coefficients of interests seems to be similar to the ones from the safe instrument 
set since the differences are mainly in the coefficients we are not interested in.   13 
Of the total of 1,167 enterprises, 36 were immediately removed from the sample because 
they were liquidated early in the process. 402 enterprises, that haven’t been identified as a 
master or spun-off unit, had missing data in one or more years and were omitted from the 
sample.
16 Our final sample consists of 729 enterprises, of which 530 represent a control group of 
firms that experienced no spin-off during the period under study, 67 firms are identified as 
master and the remaining 132 firms as subsidiary enterprises. 
As identification of spin-offs represents the main focus of our study, the procedure needs 
additional justification. However, the data set contains no explicit indicator of the breakups. In 
identifying b reakups we used an additional base provided by the Macedonian Agency for 
Privatization. The firms were obliged to present a brief history of the firm when submitting their 
privatization program to the Agency in order to obtain approval for privatization. H owever, 
those reports describe firms’ history only up to 1991. Going carefully through those reports, we 
managed to identify 25 pairs of master and spun-off subsidiaries that occurred at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Before the first wave of privatization started (Markovic privatization in 1989) 
breakups almost never happened. We identified the remaining 42 master enterprises by 
examining data on labor and capital through the period very carefully. Most of the spin-offs 
occurred in 1994 and 1995 before the privatization program for firms was enforced. 
The total sample includes enterprises from all industries of the Macedonian economy 
that were subject to privatization, except agriculture, and covers the period 1991-1999 but 
without any data for 1993 as firms were not obliged to report anything in that year. Due to that 
and the fact that in 1991 and 1992 the inflation exceeded any reasonable number, we are going 
to use only data for the 1994-1999 period. However, the 1991-1992 data is a valuable source of 
pre-split information. 
According to the privatization outcome, we divided the sample into two broad groups: a) 
privatized by internal owners; and b) privatized by external owners. Within the first group, we 
have the following subgroups: employee buy-outs  by design, and employee buy-outs  by 
                                                 
16 In order to verify we are not contaminating our results with sample-selection bias due to 
large number of omitted observations we have run the Heckman 2-step method to correct for this 
possible flaw. It turned out that the sample selection is not an issue in this case. First, we tried 
two specifications of the first step of sample selection correction. Both specifications had 
exactly the same predictive power (71.5% of correct prediction) and the richer specification with 
industry-controls could be collapsed to the simpler one on 1% level of significance (but not on 
5% level). In both models the firm size was a significant predictor of inclusion/exclusion. 
Nevertheless, the inverse Mills ratio was never significant for the simpler model in any 2
nd step 
of the estimation, while the richer model yielded significant coefficient at inverse Mills ratio on 
5% level just 4 times out of the all runs reported in Tables 4-8. Therefore, we conclude that the 
non-reporting had no link to sample-selection and we report the more efficient results that are   14 
outcome
17. The first subgroup comprises 199, whereas the second subgroup encompasses 338 
firms. The second subgroup is not only the most numerous but it also dominates the Macedonian 
privatization outcome according to other parameters, too. Externally owned firms were divided 
into four groups. The first group includes firms privatized to foreign firms (20 cases), while the 
second represent firms established by firms from the former Yugoslavia whose ownership was 
simply acknowledged and have been privatized from the very beginning of the process (85 
cases). The third group is the group of subsidiaries of other firms (64 cases). Other external 
owners acquired stakes in firms mostly through debt to equity swaps or leasing (22 firms). 
 
Table 2: Chosen privatization method for all privatized and sampled firms 
 Privatization method  Population (%)  Sample (%) 
Internal  71.4  73.6 
Employee buy-out  39.3  37.0 
Other internal methods  60.7  63.0 
External  28.6  26.4 
Foreign owners  9.0  10.4 
Ex-Yugoslav owners  48.0  44.5 
Daughter firms  33.1  33.5 
Other external methods  9.9  11.6 
 
Comparing distribution of privatization method adopted by firms in our sample to all 
privatized firms we see that there are not many differences and we can say that our sample is 
quite representative. 
The summary statistics, shown in Table A1 in the Table Appendix, report that the 
average company analyzed in our sample employed 242 employees in 1994 and 178 employees 
in 1999; while the average value of fixed assets per worker was MKD 0.434 million and 0.821 
                                                                                                                                                             
not based on the Heckman 2-step method. 
17 EBO was designed as a model according to the privatization law only for small 
enterprises (enterprises with less than 50 employees, and with relatively small assets and annual 
turnover, specifically defined by the law). According to this model, the employees had the first 
right of refusal of the EBO model. Only if they did not exercise this right (which had happened 
very rarely), outsiders could be invited. Unlike this model, in some of the other models which 
were publicly announced aimed at attracting investors from the outside, it turned out that the 
only bidders were the employees who would have prepared a privatization bid to purchase the 
company, utilizing all general advantages (e.g. discounts given by law), as well as insider 
knowledge and their position in the company. The second subgroup is referred to as EBO by 
outcome.   15 
million (1994 prices) in 1994 and 1999, respectively. Value added per worker dropped 
significantly during the period from MKD 1.312 million to 0.375 million (1994 prices) in 1994 
and 1999, respectively. 
Comparing firms that experienced spin-offs to control group of firms shows that the first 
group was much larger on average through the whole period in terms of labor but less capital 
intensive. Interestingly, value added per worker at the beginning of the period was, on average, 
almost three times higher in the firms that didn’t experience spin-offs compared to master firms 
but the difference decreased through the whole period with only 65% higher at the end of the 
period. Spun-off firms were, on average, smaller employing  175 workers in 1994 and less 
capital intensive. Their value added per employee has a downward trend through the period 
under study. 
 
Table 3: Privatization methods chosen by different groups of firms 











N  167  220  17  83  40  5  532  No  
spin-offs  %  31.39  41.35  3.20  15.60  7.52  0.94  100 
N  9  50  2  1  1  3  66 
Master  
%  13.64  75.76  3.03  1.52  1.52  4.55  100 
N  23  68  1  1  23  14  130 
Spun-offs 
%  17.69  52.31  0.77  0.77  17.69  10.77  100 
Total    199  338  20  85  64  22  728 
 
Table 3 shows that firms experiencing spin-offs were more likely to adopt internal 
privatization methods compared to the control group of firms. Interestingly, firms that didn’t 
experienced spin-offs, were, more than average, privatized by employees as EBO at the very 
beginning of privatization, and to external owners. Master enterprises ended up owned by 
internal owners, while spun-off units were, above average, privatized using leasing or debt-
equity-swap (other external methods). 
 
5. Estimation Results 
We have estimated the equation (1) for the listed indicators of performance. Our strategy 
was to provide results that should verify the theoretical foundations. The empirical estimates of   16 
the effect of the split are shown in Table 4 - Table 8. Other parameter estimates (those which are 
not of our interest) are not reported. Each table is constructed for different performance 
indicators, while within the tables the estimators differ in the definition of instrumental sets as 
well as in the “time-frame” and inclusion/exclusion of privatization dummies. Although the 
1991 data cannot be really used as the pre-split characteristics because of the extreme inflation 
in these years, they also cannot serve as instruments for the characteristics of the split in 
measures not involving sales (the Hausman test in the majority of cases indicate invalidity of 
1991/92 values as instruments). The notion that the hyperinflation makes the link with future 
outcomes nil (i.e., these characteristics are likely to be uncorrelated with the error term in 
equation (1) capturing the performance in the late nineties as well) while it can still hold 
information (like people’s sentiment towards that firm) that could affect the decision on and 
occurrence of the split is rejected by the Hausman test. As mentioned earlier, the safe instrument 
set comprises data from the Macedonian Privatization Agency – including social capital, shares 
allocated to the pension fund, total capital, i.e., values characterizing the enterprise that were 
exogenously set either by the central planer or by the privatization authority. 
The method of privatization as instrument set is another option we explored. A priori, we 
admit that these instruments might not be perceived as exogenous. However, the method of 
privatization was prescribed by the law and decided on by the government. In this case, the 
decisions on the means of privatization were not in the hands of insiders and are likely to be 
uncorrelated with the unobserved characteristics. On the other hand, given the law was 
established and known well before any split could take place (Markovic Law was passed in 1989 
and Macedonian Privatization Law was passed in 1993), the managers could initiate or block 
split in order to push the firm into a category of privatization they preferred – in this case the 
instruments would not be valid. Yet, the regression results show that the results are not sensitive 
to this instrument and the Hausman favors the validity of privatization instruments so the former 
argument receives strong empirical support. 
In all cases we use the 1994 values as the best pre-split characteristics we have, also note 
that in 1994 the hyperinflation was already under control (see Table A4), i.e., this is the vector X 
of pre-treatment characteristics. The 1995 data is from the year of the splits, thus we never use 
them in order not to contaminate our results. We use 1996-99 values respectively as the post-
split characteristics (LHS of equation (1)). 
The structure of the Tables 4-8 is as follows: In each double-column for a given set of 
instruments are coefficients associated with the dummy indicating split for the master (first sub-
column) and for the subsidiaries (second sub-column) listed according to the year of the   17 
comparison. All models use 1994 data as pre-split characteristics. The standard errors are in 
parentheses and stars denote the conventional statistical significance. 
Let us briefly discuss the particular result of each performance indicator. Table 4 lists the 
results of profit per labor comparison. The effect is nil or most likely negative on the master firm 
since the coefficients are in general insignificantly negative and often significantly negative 
(also in the case of small safe instrument set). We can safely conclude that the effect is negative 
on the subsidiary in the years 1996-1999 since with the exception of three instrumental sets, 
there are always at least two subsidiary coefficients negative out of the four years. In addition, 
the most significant results are those based on safe instrument set and all coefficients (with one 
exception close to zero) in all specifications are negative or significantly negative. 
The value added per labor results are shown in Table 5. Here we can again clearly see a 
similar pattern as in the case of profit per labor, but more pronounced. There is again a clear 
pattern showing irrespective of the instrumental set that the effect of a split was nil for the 
master enterprises in most cases (however, there are two significant negative coefficients for the 
safe instrument set). The effect on subsidiaries is mostly significantly negative, irrespective of 
the instrument set, and the only remaining insignificant coefficient using the safe instrument set 
is also negative. 
In Table 6 coefficients for the total cost per labor are shown. Here the results are less 
clear although a consistent pattern exists as well. The effect of a split is likely to be negative on 
the subsidiaries with about one fourth of coefficients significantly negative (negative effect 
means reduction of costs) and nil or positive for the master enterprises. The coefficients 
capturing the effect of split on the master are mostly positive, although only three are 
significantly positive. 
The effect on profit per capital is negative for subsidiaries in all years although mostly 
insignificantly; the coefficients are shown in Table 7. The effect on master enterprises is again 
mostly insignificantly negative (partly significant in case of privatization instruments). This is 
the only measure when the 1991/1992 values were accepted as valid instruments for 1996, 1997, 
and 1999. Yet, we would rather focus on the results using the safe instruments and instruments 
not rejected in other specifications. 
The last set of results is related to the sales per employee; Table 8. This is the only set of 
results where we do observe significant differences depending on the instrument sets also in the 
coefficients of interest. Indeed, the Hausman test rejects the validity of 1991/1992 values as 
instruments. The prevailing effect on master enterprises is positive in the case of the safe 
instrument set and in the case when the instrument set does not contain the 1991/92 values.   18 
(There are, however, significant negative coefficients in cases when the past values are in the 
instrument set). On the other hand, the effect on subsidiary is mostly insignificantly negative 
irrespective of the instrument set. 
To sum up, the sales per labor shows a different sensitivity pattern to the instrument set 
compared to all other performance measures in the coefficients of interest. The results are quite 
robust and the pattern is quite stable over specifications, years and instrument sets. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our analysis of Macedonia, which is a specific case among transition economies where 
large number of break-ups occurred at the beginning of privatization, shows that there are 
systemic effects of breakups on the performance. Using firm-level data, we estimated the effects 
of the break-ups of enterprises on the subsequent performance of the “master enterprises” and 
spun off divisions during the period of privatization. We have estimated the performance effects 
by comparing the performance of enterprises that remained intact to the performance of 
enterprises that experienced spin-offs and the newly established subsidiaries. 
We have found that the newly established subsidiaries perform worse than the control 
group with respect to all measures used while the master enterprises seems to vary between 
being intact or (less) harmed. Both types seem to be harmed in case of value added per labor, 
although the safe-instruments suggest that the negative effect was not always affecting the 
master enterprise. On the contrary the master enterprises seem to be unaffected or mildly 
negatively affected in case of value per labor while the subsidiaries unambiguously suffered 
according to this measure. Both master enterprises and subsidiaries do not differ significantly 
from the control group in case of total costs per labor, although there are signals that the 
subsidiaries could slightly cut total costs per labor while the masters could increase their 
spending. Thus, the subsidiaries have lower total costs per labor compared to the control group 
and master enterprises. Also both master enterprises and subsidiaries are not different from the 
control group in terms of profit per capital although the subsidiaries seem to be negatively 
affected. Finally, the masters benefited from the split in terms of sales per labor compared to the 
control group while the subsidiaries were most likely harmed (but the coefficients are 
insignificant). 
We should note that the 1991 and 1992 values do not seem to be valid instruments. To 
conclude, the empirical results do not favor unanimously one of the four hypotheses outlined in 
the beginning of the article. Nevertheless, given the fact that subsidiaries have lower profitability 
per worker and value added per worker although they have reduced total costs per worker and   19 
the master enterprises have higher sales per worker and mildly suffered (profit per labor) or were 
not affected according to other measures (value added per worker, total costs per labor, profit 
per capital), ceteris paribus, we can infer that hypothesis (iv) receives a strong support while 
hypothesis (i) is plausible but with much less empirical support. 
While hypothesis (iv) is evidence of tunneling or asset stripping, hypothesis (i) can be a 
sign of two phenomena stemming form the design of Macedonian privatization. 
In general, hypothesis (i) means that the break-ups occur because the top managers of the 
SOEs discard poorly performing divisions in order to improve the performance of the 
(remaining) master enterprises (in case of sales per labor), or take actions that harm the 
subsidiaries (all measures) and harm (profit per labor) or do not help the remaining master firm 
(all remaining measures). In this light the poorer profit per capital performance can be 
economically well explained - if the master enterprises try to keep as much capital as possible 
during the spin-off then its capital stock would be higher and hence the profit per capital appears 
lower. This means that the master firm keeps more capital than the common portion would be 
for that type of firm and, consequently, the profit per capital decreases while the other measures 
of performance might not be so adversely affected or may even improve. 
An alternative of labor shedding that is also in line with the institutional setup of 
Macedonian privatization leads to a similar outcome. The master enterprise sheds unwanted 
labor using overstaffed subsidiaries. This would also manifest itself by deterioration of 
performance measures per labor of the subsidiaries while helping the master enterprise in these 
measures.   20 
Appendix 1 - A Simple Model of Enterprise Breakups 
Let us start with the motivation for applying for a split on the part of the management of 
a subsidiary. We distinguish the relevant part of the enterprise by superscripts, where M denotes 
the master enterprise from which a subsidiary  S has split, and  M+S refers to the whole 
enterprise before the split. Assume that the compensation of the management of subsidiary 
before the split is an increasing function of performance (say in terms of profits or output) of a 
firm before the split ?
M+S, multiplied by some coefficient a derived from the relative importance 
of the subsidiary for the whole firm. We can, for example, define a in terms of the number of 
employees, i.e.,  a = N
S/N
M+S (or capital,  a = K
S/K
M+S). Hence the subsidiary management 
compensation is f(a?
M+S). We also assume that, if the split is approved, the compensation of the 
management of the subsidiary will be the same function of the profit of the subsidiary itself, i.e., 
f(?
S).
18 Obviously, the subsidiary management will apply  (and we can observe the split 
motivated by subsidiary) only if f(a?
M+S) < f(?
S). It clearly follows that the management of 
subsidiary is motivated to apply for the split (and the split can be initiated by the subsidiary's 
management) only if a?
M+S < ?
S. If a is determined by the number of employees it can be 




S. Since for the estimation it is useful to work in relative 
terms, we can state the condition as  p
M+S < p
S, where  p stands for the relative performance 




If the split is initiated by the master enterprise, the obvious requirement is that 
f(?
M+S) < f(?
M) and so  ?
M+S < ?
M. We could homogenize the performance measure by 
dividing it by some measure of the scale of the firm as before. The last inequality normalized by 






M, we can simplify the 





M, and  in relative terms  p
M+S < p
M. We can always assume that if 
subsidiaries suffered from the split and the master parts benefited, the respective management 
was able to design compensation schemes enabling the benefits of splits to be shared (see Lizal 
et al. 1995). 
We can conclude that for an observed split to be motivated by compensation uniformly 




M has to hold.
19 
                                                 
18 Therefore, we assume that the state uses the same formula to derive management 
compensation in all enterprises. A more relaxed interpretation would be that we assume that the 
differences in the transformation of profits into management compensation are not very 
significant across firms. As to the nature of function f(.), one would intuitively assume that it 
would be a concave and increasing function of its argument. 
19 Moreover, here is also clearly visible that the setting of the model enables us to test also 




M has to hold. The “perverse”, i.e., private   21 
For the empirical analysis of the effects of breakups on the performance of subsidiaries 
and master enterprises experiencing splits it is necessary to assume that management has rational 
expectations of performance with or without a split conditioned on the state of the enterprises 
before the split. The background of the analysis of splits we use is this simple theoretical model 
that is in line with model of Lizal et al. (2001) and therefore the results are directly comparable. 
                                                                                                                                                             
benefit, (Hypothesis 4) behavioral motivation of managers is inconsistent with the model based 





M – loss or no gain in terms of performance indicator is observed but the split was 
pursued. However, it could be also a combination of inequality and equality, e.g., no gain for 
master and worse performance for subsidiary, etc. This is the reason why our approach is able to 
reveal in the empirical part behavior that should be never observed if there is a positive 
monotonic link between performance and managerial reward and no other managerial benefits 
can be obtained (i.e., privatize the enterprise).   22 
References 
Aghion, Phillipe, Blanchard O., Burgess R., 1994. The Behaviour of State Firms in Eastern 
Europe, Pre-privatisation. European Economic Review 38, 1327-1349. 
Alchian, Armen A., Demsetz, Harold, 1972. Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization. American Economic Review 65, 777-795. 
Bartlett, Will, 1997 . The Transformation and Demise of Self-Managed Firms in Croatia, 
Macedonia and Slovenia. In: Sharma, S., (ed.), Restructuring in Eastern Europe: the 
Microeconomics of Transition Economies, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, (1997). 
Black, Bernard, Kraakman, Reinier, Tarassova, Anna, 2000. Russian Privatization and 
Corporate Governance: What went wrong?.  Stanford Law Review, 52, 7: 1731 – 1808. 
Blanchard, Olivier, 1997. The Economics of Post-Communist Transition. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
Burda, Michael C., 1993. Unemployment, Labour Markets and Structural Change in Eastern 
Europe. Economic Policy 16. 
Chandler, Alfred D., 1990. Scale and Scope. Belknap Press, Cambridge. 
Coase, Ronald H., 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4. Reprinted in: Stigler, George J., 
Boulding, Kenneth E. (Eds.), 1952. Readings in Price Theory. Irwin (for AEA), 
Homewood, Il. 
Djankov, Simeon, Murrell, Peter, 2002. Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative 
Survey. C.E.P.R. Discussion number 3319. 
Domadenik, Polona, Prasnikar, Janez, Svejnar, Jan, 2001. Restructuring Slovenian Firms in 
Imperfectly Developed Markets. Paper presented at WDI & CEPR Conference 
Economics of Transition, Portorož. 
Drummond, Paulo, 2000. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Banking Soundness and 
Recent Lessons. IMF Working Paper, Washington D.C. 
Dyba, Karel, Svejnar, Jan, 1995. A Comparative View of Economic Developments in the Czech 
Republic.Iin J. Svejnar, (Ed.), The Czech Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern 
Europe. Academic Press, San Diego. 
Ellerman, David, 1998. Voucher Privatization with Investment Funds. Working Paper No. 167, 
The William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School. 
Grossman, Sanford J., Hart, Oliver D., 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy 94, 691-719. 
Hart, Oliver, Moore, John, 1990. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political 
Economy 98, 1119-1158. 
Heckman, James J., Singer, Burton S., 1985. Longitudinal Analysis of Labor Market Data, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.   23 
Jorgenson, D., 1987. Comments on Lichtenberg, Frank R. and Siegel, Donald Productivity and 
Changes in Ownership of Manufacturing Plants. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 
3. 
Kaplan, Steven N., Weisbach, Michael S., 1992. The Success of Acquisitions: Evidence from 
Divestitures. The Journal of Finance 47, 107-138. 
Klein, Benjamnin, Crawford, Robert G., Alchian, Armen A., 1978. Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal Law and 
Economics 21, 297-326. 
Kotrba, Jiri, 1995. Privatization Process in the Czech Republic: Players and Winners,” in  
Svejnar, Jan (Ed.), The Czech Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe. 
Academic Press, San Diego. 
Lichtenberg, Frank R. and Siegel, Donald, 1987. Productivity and Changes in Ownership of 
Manufacturing Plants. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, special issue, 3, 643-683. 
Lizal, Lubomir, Singer, Miroslav, Svejnar, Jan, 1995. Manager Interests, Breakups and 
Performance of State E nterprises in Transition. In Svejnar, Jan (Ed.), The Czech 
Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe. Academic Press, San Diego. 
Lizal, Lubomir, Singer, Miroslav, Svejnar, Jan, 2001. Enterprise Breakups and Performance 
during the Transition from Plan to Market. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(1), 
92-99. 
Maddala, G. S., 1993. Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Markovska, Verica, 2000. Privatization in the Republic of Macedonia. Mimeo. 
Prasnikar, Janez, Bartlett, Will, Domadenik, Polona, Markovska, Verica, 2002. The Productivity 
of Firms in Transition: The Case of Slovenia and Macedonia. Working Paper of RCEF, 
University of Ljubljana. 
Prasnikar, Janez, Gregoric, Aleksandra, 2002. The Influence of Workers’ Participation on the 
Power of Management in Transitional Countries: The Case of Slovenia. Annals of Public 
and Cooperative Economics. 
Prasnikar, Janez, Svejnar, Jan, 1998. Investment, Wages and Ownership during the Transition to 
a Market Economy: Evidence from Slovenian Firms. Working Paper No. 184, The 
William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School. 
Prasnikar, Janez, Svejnar, Jan, Mihaljek, Dubravko and Prasnikar, V esna, 1994. Behavior of 
Participatory Firms in Yugoslavia: Lessons for Transforming Economies. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 76, 728-740. 
Prasnikar, Janez, Koman Matjaz, Grobelnik, Marko, 1998. Is there an appropriation of the social 
ownership by managers of Slovene firms? Working Paper No. 65, Faculty of Economics.   24 
Radner, Roy, van Zandt, Timothy, 1992. Information Processing in Firms and Returns to Scale. 
Annales D'Economie Et De Statistique 25, 265-298. 
Ravenscraft, David J. and F. M. Scherer, “Life after Takeover,” The Journal of Industrial 
Economics 36 (1987), 147-156. 
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W., 1994. Politicians and Firms. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 109, 945-1026. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Treisman, Daniel, 2000. Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic 
Reform in Russia. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. 
Stiglitz, Joseph, 1987. Comments on Lichtenberg, Frank R. and Donald Siegel, “Productivity 
and Changes in Ownership of Manufacturing Plants,” Brooking Papers on Economic 
Activity, special issue – 3. 
Stiglitz, Joseph, 1999. Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition. Paper presented at the 
1999 Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, World Bank: Washington, 
DC. 
Vanek, Jaroslav, 1970. The General Theory of Labor-Manager Market Economies. Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, NY. 
Ward, Benjamin, 1958. The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism. American Economic Review 
68, 566-589. 
Weiss, Andrew, Nikitin, Gregoriy, 1998. Performance of Czech Companies by Ownership 
Structure. Working Paper No. 186, The William Davidson Institute, University of 
Michigan Business School. 
Williamson, Oliver E., 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, Free 
Press, New York. 
Williamson, Oliver E., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting. Free Press, New York. 
World Bank, 1996. World Development Report 1996. World Bank, Washington, D.C.. 
Zemplinerova, A. and Stibal, J., 1995. Czech Manufacturing. In Svejnar, Jan (Ed.), The Czech 
Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe. Academic Press, San Diego. 
   25 
Table Appendix 
 
Table A1: Means of selected variables for total sample  
 
 Year  Total  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Number of employees  233.2951 242.8729 222.7914 208.0936 198.9557  198.9557 178.6865
Fixed assets per employee  719692.9 434085.8 469161.9 1175942 650995  650995 821127.1
Gross wage per employee  162091.9 167599.2 168392.1 169669.2 165114.3  165114.3 169688.7
Total sales per employee  1530417 1651301 1538560 1392326 1526453  1526453 1619678
Profit per employee  -3027.065 -597.338 -4844.65 -50858.8 -17421.3  -17421.3 -14880.2
Total costs per employee  675246.5 542144.8 536943.7 580312.4 546818.7  546818.7 1461998
Value added per employee  1060716 1312217 1207442 1048664 1186170  1186170 374932.5
   26 
Table A2A: Means of selected performance indicators by groups of firms 
Year   1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
 
Firms that didn't experience breakups                
Number of employees 
205.242 193.7089 183.7302 171.8046 167.0247 163.6484
Fixed assets per employee  459254.3 490413 1369942 667655.2 716642.3 899575.1
Gross wage per employee  175566.5 180744.5 182664 178242.7 176954.6 185011.1
Total sales per employee  1871826 1776147 1596696 1845815 1718896 1977166
Profit per employee  10045.98 3.934.303 -48710.85 -10502.79 -11294.68 1.080.317
Total costs per employee  576254.3 582001.4 625444.6 583185.5 616118 1780822
Value added per employee  1507903 1414733 1231076 1482487 1323028 434164.3
 
Master firms             
Number of employees  671.6897 584.7069 487.7797 490.0635 363.8154 356.2308
Fixed assets per employee  423006 497411.5 702091.4 887981.6 800336.8 817212.3
Gross wage per employee  134742.7 129395.4 133104.4 132189.2 125218 130695.5
Total sales per employee  818797.2 680072.3 824879.5 761939.5 461520.6 692849.5
Profit per employee  -36483.18 -48313.81 -88302.36 -51364.11 -76276.53 -76502.54
Total costs per employee  426573.7 384486.9 460007.9 513894.1 464086.7 608797.4
Value added per employee  564917.2 465379.9 543982.1 438943.9 173089.5 263244.8
 
Spun-off firms                   
Number of employees  175.838 156.0476 165.369 161.9725 158.5143 146.3874
Fixed assets per employee  271691.7 323415 347071.9 437010.6 453434.2 464656.5
Gross wage per employee  139195.8 121939.1 117537.4 124634.9 120603.1 123070.9
Total sales per employee  804825.9 719941.1 567103.1 520508.7 617125.4 542319.2
Profit per employee  -44816.4 -26981.46 -37421.66 -29074.91 -37057.22 -50797.68
Total costs per employee  400875.6 374547.6 394556.1 400690.4 405241.4 517177
Value added per employee  567800.8 490878.6 317356.2 277650.4 358032.1 171769.9  27 
Table A2B Means of basic deflated variables by groups of firms 
Control Group                 
  1991  1992  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Labor  322  254  205  193  183  171  167  163 
Fixed ass.  247.0  189.0  99.0  98.4  98.4  104.0  99.8  106.0 
Total ass.  531.0  341.0  240.0  236.0  243.0  256.0  267.0  256.0 
Capital  292.0  212.0  110.0  114.0  119.0  123.0  122.0  127.0 
Depreciation  14.1  11.5  8.5  8.0  7.7  7.6  7.2  7.0 
Gross Wage  62.9  25.3  34.8  33.6  31.8  30.7  30.4  30.3 
Sales  406.0  186.0  171.0  173.0  164.0  181.0  176.0  209.0 
Profit  19.9  5.9  .716  4.1  -.621  3.0  2.7  4.6 
Mater. Costs  148.0  85.1  83.8  87.2  83.9  88.3  93.9  144.0 
Total Costs  225.0  122.0  127.0  129.0  123.0  127.0  132.0  181.0 
Value Added  258.0  101.0  87.3  85.5  80.6  93.1  82.3  65.4 
Master Firms                 
Labor  1012  850  671  584  487  490  364  356 
Fixed ass.  461.0  464.0  216.0  202.0  229.0  235.0  219.0  219.0 
Total ass.  1260  896.0  637.0  725.0  778.0  807.0  757.0  638.0 
Capital  504.0  493.0  240.0  249.0  327.0  309.0  278.0  311.0 
Depreciation  27.1  19.2  19.1  17.6  18.7  16.0  13.2  12.8 
Gross Wage  135.0  72.5  79.8  72.0  60.8  54.9  42.9  43.0 
Sales  812.0  496.0  473.0  364.0  363.0  271.0  187.0  222.0 
Profit  12.4  5.3  -30.4  -18.3  -39.9  -19.8  -31.3  -33.4 
Mater. Costs  363.0  237.0  176.0  143.0  161.0  157.0  139.0  146.0 
Total Costs  525.0  329.0  275.0  233.0  241.0  228.0  196.0  201.0 
Value Added  450.0  259.0  297.0  221.0  202.0  114.0  47.3  76.5 
Subsidiaries                 
Labor  225  196  175  156  165  161  158  146 
Fixed ass.  178.0  162.0  64.0  56.0  59.2  58.0  59.4  60.7 
Total ass.  337.0  225.0  141.0  157.0  170.0  201.0  208.0  163.0 
Capital  152.0  106.0  47.9  54.7  61.8  73.8  80.8  83.2 
Depreciation  15.2  9.3  5.8  4.5  5.5  4.7  4.4  4.1 
Gross Wage  37.5  22.5  24.1  19.6  18.8  18.5  18.3  18.3 
Sales  232.0  108.0  117.0  97.3  103.0  92.1  106.0  123.0 
Profit  -7.3  -10.3  -13.8  -5.2  -14.6  -9.3  -4.5  -9.0 
Mater. Costs  185.0  60.7  34.6  40.3  68.1  56.6  64.7  91.0 
Total Costs  238.0  92.5  64.5  64.5  92.4  79.8  87.5  113.0 
Value Added  46.9  47.6  82.5  57.0  34.9  35.6  41.8  32.6 
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***,**,* denotes significant coefficient at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Hausman test always accepts privatization dummies as valid instruments on any conventional level. 
Hausman test always rejects 1991/1992 values as valid instruments on any conventional level, with exception of year 1997.  
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***,**,* denotes significant coefficient at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Hausman test always accepts privatization dummies as valid instruments on any conventional level. 
Hausman test always rejects 1991/1992 values as valid instruments on any conventional level.  
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***,**,* denotes significant coefficient at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Hausman test always accepts privatization dummies as valid instruments on any conventional level, with exception of year 1998. 
Hausman test always rejects 1991/1992 values as valid instruments on any conventional level, with exception of year 1996. 
 


































































































































































































































































































































































Yes   







































***,**,* denotes significant coefficient at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Hausman test always accepts privatization dummies as valid instruments on any conventional level. 
Hausman test always accepts 1991/1992 values as valid instruments on any conventional level, with exception of year 1998. 
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***,**,* denotes significant coefficient at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Hausman test always accepts privatization dummies as valid instruments on any conventional level. 
Hausman test always rejects 1991/1992 values as valid instruments on any conventional level. 
 








i   +   D   +   D   +   X     =    CERGE-EI
P.O.BOX 882
Politických vezòù 7
111 21 Prague 1
Czech Republic
http://www.cerge-ei.cz